ATLAS is a separate framework from ATT&CK

ATLAS techniques use AML.* identifiers and are never treated as ATT&CK technique IDs. Where ATLAS itself lists an ATT&CK reference we show it as such; any other relationship on this site is an explicit, reviewed Securitain judgement. See also the MITRE ATT&CK tactic guides.

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ATLAS tactics

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Technique explorer

129 techniques shown

  • AML.T0000

    Search Open Technical Databases

    Reconnaissance · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1596

    Adversaries may search for publicly available research and technical documentation to learn how and where AI is used within a victim organization. The adversary can use this information to identify targets for attack,…

  • AML.T0001

    Search Open AI Vulnerability Analysis

    Reconnaissance · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Much like the Search Open Technical Databases, there is often ample research available on the vulnerabilities of common AI models. Once a target has been identified, an adversary will likely try to identify any pre-ex…

  • AML.T0002

    Acquire Public AI Artifacts

    Resource Development · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may search public sources, including cloud storage, public-facing services, and software or data repositories, to identify AI artifacts. These AI artifacts may include the software stack used to train and…

  • AML.T0003

    Search Victim-Owned Websites

    Reconnaissance · Maturity: Demonstrated · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1594

    Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain technical details about their AI-enabled products or services. Victim-owned webs…

  • AML.T0004

    Search Application Repositories

    Reconnaissance · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may search open application repositories during targeting. Examples of these include Google Play, the iOS App store, the macOS App Store, and the Microsoft Store. Adversaries may craft search queries seek…

  • AML.T0005

    Replicate AI Model Behavior

    Resource Development · AI Attack Adaptation · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may replicate an AI model's behavior or selected capabilities by training or adapting another model to approximate the target's responses, decision regions, or other characteristics. The result may be a su…

  • AML.T0006

    Active Scanning

    Reconnaissance · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1595

    Adversaries may actively scan for publicly reachable AI systems and resources for targeting. They may identify resources or systems that are misconfigured or are known vulnerable versions. This is distinct from other…

  • AML.T0007

    Discover AI Artifacts

    Discovery · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may search private sources to identify AI learning artifacts that exist on the system and gather information about them. These artifacts can include the software stack used to train and deploy models, trai…

  • AML.T0008

    Acquire Infrastructure

    Resource Development · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1583

    Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure for use throughout their operation. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physi…

  • AML.T0010

    Supply Chain Compromise

    Initial Access · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1195

    Adversaries may manipulate products, components, or their development and delivery mechanisms before they reach downstream consumers to compromise data or systems. Manipulation may involve source code, dependencies, d…

  • AML.T0011

    User Execution

    Execution · Maturity: Realized

    An adversary may rely upon a user to load, execute, interpret, or otherwise use a malicious or unsafe artifact. In AI systems, user execution may include loading a model or causing an inference runtime to process exec…

  • AML.T0012

    Valid Accounts

    Initial Access · Privilege Escalation · Lateral Movement · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1078

    Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access. Credentials may take the form of usernames and passwords of individual user accounts or API keys that provide acc…

  • AML.T0013

    Discover AI Model Ontology

    Discovery · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may discover the ontology of an AI model's output space, for example, the types of objects a model can detect. The adversary may discover the ontology by repeated queries to the model, forcing it to enumer…

  • AML.T0014

    Discover AI Model Family

    Discovery · Maturity: Feasible

    Adversaries may discover the general family of a model. General information about the model may be revealed in documentation, or the adversary may use carefully constructed examples and analyze the model's responses t…

  • AML.T0015

    Evade AI Model

    Initial Access · Defense Evasion · Impact · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries can Craft Adversarial Data that prevents an AI model from correctly identifying the contents of the data or Generate Deepfakes that fools an AI model expecting authentic data. This technique can be used t…

  • AML.T0016

    Obtain Capabilities

    Resource Development · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1588

    Adversaries may search for and obtain software capabilities for use in their operations. Capabilities may be specific to AI-based attacks Adversarial AI Attack Implementations or generic software tools repurposed for…

  • AML.T0017

    Develop Capabilities

    Resource Development · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1587

    Adversaries may develop their own capabilities to support operations. This process encompasses identifying requirements, building or adapting solutions, validating or packaging capabilities, and preparing them for dep…

  • AML.T0018

    Manipulate AI Model

    AI Attack Adaptation · Persistence · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may manipulate an AI model artifact or its bundled components to change AI system behavior, introduce malicious code, or establish persistent malicious functionality. This may include modifying model weigh…

  • AML.T0020

    Training Data Poisoning

    Persistence · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may manipulate data used for training or fine-tuning an AI model to influence the resulting model's behavior. Adversaries may add, remove, or modify data samples; alter labels or annotations; or manipulate…

  • AML.T0021

    Establish Accounts

    Resource Development · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1585

    Adversaries may create accounts with various services for use in targeting, to gain access to resources needed to further their operations, or for victim impersonation.

  • AML.T0024

    Exfiltration via AI Inference API

    Exfiltration · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may exfiltrate information from a victim-controlled AI model or service through responses returned by its inference API. Transferred information may include predictions, scores, embeddings, generated conte…

  • AML.T0025

    Exfiltration via Cyber Means

    Exfiltration · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may exfiltrate AI artifacts or other information relevant to their goals via traditional cyber means. See the ATT&CK Exfiltration tactic for more information.

  • AML.T0029

    Denial of AI Service

    Impact · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may target AI-enabled systems with a flood of requests for the purpose of degrading or shutting down the service. Since many AI systems require significant amounts of specialized compute, they are often ex…

  • AML.T0031

    Erode AI Model Integrity

    Impact · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may degrade the target model's performance with adversarial data inputs to erode confidence in the system over time. This can lead to the victim organization wasting time and money both attempting to fix t…

  • AML.T0034

    Cost Harvesting

    Impact · Maturity: Feasible

    Adversaries may deliberately drive a victim's AI services beyond normal operating capacity with the intent of increasing the cost of services. This may be achieved via high-volume, low-complexity queries (Excessive Qu…

  • AML.T0035

    AI Artifact Collection

    Collection · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may collect AI artifacts for Exfiltration or for use in AI Attack Adaptation. AI artifacts include models and datasets as well as other telemetry data produced when interacting with a model.

  • AML.T0036

    Data from Information Repositories

    Collection · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1213

    Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing be…

  • AML.T0037

    Data from Local System

    Collection · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1005

    Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems and configuration files or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. This can include basic fingerprinting…

  • AML.T0040

    AI Model Inference API Access

    AI Model Access · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may gain access to a model via legitimate access to the inference API. Inference API access can be a source of information to the adversary (Discover AI Model Ontology, Discover AI Model Family), a means o…

  • AML.T0041

    Physical Environment Access

    AI Model Access · Maturity: Demonstrated

    In addition to the attacks that take place purely in the digital domain, adversaries may also exploit the physical environment for their attacks. If the model is interacting with data collected from the real world in…

  • AML.T0042

    Verify Attack

    AI Attack Adaptation · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries can verify the efficacy of their attack via an inference API or access to an offline copy of the target model. This gives the adversary confidence that their approach works and allows them to carry out the…

  • AML.T0043

    Craft Adversarial Data

    AI Attack Adaptation · Maturity: Realized

    Adversarial data are inputs to an AI model that have been modified such that they cause the adversary's desired effect in the target model. Effects can range from misclassification, to missed detections, to maximizing…

  • AML.T0044

    Full AI Model Access

    AI Model Access · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may gain full "white-box" access to an AI model. This means the adversary has complete knowledge of the model architecture, its parameters, and class ontology. They may exfiltrate the model to Craft Advers…

  • AML.T0046

    Spamming AI System with Chaff Data

    Impact · Maturity: Feasible

    Adversaries may spam the AI system with chaff data that causes increase in the number of detections. This can cause analysts at the victim organization to waste time reviewing and correcting incorrect inferences. Adv…

  • AML.T0047

    AI-Enabled Product or Service

    AI Model Access · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may use a product or service that uses artificial intelligence under the hood to gain access to the underlying AI model. This type of indirect model access may reveal details of the AI model or its inferen…

  • AML.T0048

    External Harms

    Impact · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may abuse their access to a victim system and use its resources or capabilities to further their goals by causing harms external to that system. These harms could affect the organization (e.g. Financial Ha…

  • AML.T0049

    Exploit Public-Facing Application

    Initial Access · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1190

    Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior. The weakness in the system ca…

  • AML.T0050

    Command and Scripting Interpreter

    Execution · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1059

    Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many di…

  • AML.T0051

    LLM Prompt Injection

    Execution · Maturity: Realized

    An adversary may craft malicious prompts as inputs to an LLM that cause the LLM to act in unintended ways. These "prompt injections" are often designed to cause the model to ignore aspects of its original instructions…

  • AML.T0052

    Phishing

    Initial Access · Lateral Movement · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1566

    Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a spe…

  • AML.T0053

    AI Agent Tool Invocation

    Execution · Privilege Escalation · Lateral Movement · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may use their access to an AI agent to invoke tools the agent has access to. LLMs are often connected to other services or resources via tools to increase their capabilities. Tools may include integrations…

  • AML.T0054

    LLM Jailbreak

    Privilege Escalation · Defense Evasion · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may induce a large language model (LLM) to ignore, circumvent, or override its safety/alignment behaviors and/or guardrails to elicit outputs the model is intended to withhold. Once jailbroken, the LLM may…

  • AML.T0055

    Unsecured Credentials

    Credential Access · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1552

    Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. bash history…

  • AML.T0059

    Erode Dataset Integrity

    Impact · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may poison or manipulate portions of a dataset to reduce its usefulness, reduce trust, and cause users to waste resources correcting errors.

  • AML.T0060

    Publish Hallucinated Entities

    Resource Development · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may create an entity they control, such as a software package, website, or email address corresponding to a source hallucinated by an LLM. The hallucinations may take the form of package names, commands, U…

  • AML.T0061

    LLM Prompt Self-Replication

    Persistence · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may introduce a prompt designed to replicate itself in a large language model's (LLM) output. The reproduced instructions may appear in generated messages, documents, source-code, files, or other artifacts…

  • AML.T0062

    Discover LLM Hallucinations

    Discovery · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may prompt large language models and identify hallucinated entities. They may request software packages, commands, URLs, organization names, or e-mail addresses, and identify hallucinations with no connect…

  • AML.T0063

    Discover AI Model Outputs

    Discovery · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may discover what information an AI model or service exposes through its outputs. They may investigate both the intended responses and additional model-generated information exposed through the surrounding…

  • AML.T0064

    Gather RAG-Indexed Targets

    Reconnaissance · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may identify data sources used in retrieval augmented generation (RAG) systems for targeting purposes. By pinpointing these sources, attackers can focus on poisoning or otherwise manipulating the external…

  • AML.T0065

    LLM Prompt Crafting

    AI Attack Adaptation · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may use their acquired knowledge of the target generative AI system to craft prompts that bypass its defenses and allow malicious instructions to be executed. They may iterate on prompts to ensure that the…

  • AML.T0066

    Retrieval Content Crafting

    AI Attack Adaptation · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may write content designed to be retrieved by user queries and influence a user of the system in some way. This abuses the trust the user has in the system. The crafted content can be combined with a prom…

  • AML.T0067

    LLM Trusted Output Components Manipulation

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may utilize prompts to a large language model (LLM) which manipulate various components of its response in order to make it appear trustworthy to the user. This helps the adversary continue to operate in t…

  • AML.T0068

    LLM Prompt Obfuscation

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may hide or otherwise obfuscate prompt injections or retrieval content to avoid detection from humans, large language model (LLM) guardrails, or other detection mechanisms. Text inputs may be obfuscated b…

  • AML.T0069

    Discover LLM System Information

    Discovery · Maturity: Demonstrated

    The adversary is trying to discover something about the large language model's (LLM) system information. This may be found in a configuration file containing the system instructions or extracted via interactions with…

  • AML.T0070

    RAG Poisoning

    Persistence · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may inject malicious content into data indexed by a retrieval augmented generation (RAG) system to contaminate a future thread through RAG-based search results. This may be accomplished by placing manipula…

  • AML.T0071

    False RAG Entry Injection

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may introduce false entries into a victim's retrieval augmented generation (RAG) database. Content designed to be interpreted as a document by the large language model (LLM) used in the RAG system is inclu…

  • AML.T0072

    Cyber Communication Channel

    Command and Control · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may establish or use cyber communication channels for command and control. A channel may use any network protocol, service, repository, relay, or other intermediary and may operate synchronously or asynchr…

  • AML.T0073

    Impersonation

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1684.001

    Adversaries may impersonate an existing person or organization, trusted AI agent, or present a fabricated persona as a trustworthy or independent party, to persuade a target to act on their behalf. Claimed identities…

  • AML.T0074

    Masquerading

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1036

    Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or mali…

  • AML.T0075

    Enterprise Resource Discovery

    Discovery · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may discover resources available within an enterprise environment and information needed to identify or access them. Resources may include accounts, groups, systems, devices, virtual machines, files, direc…

  • AML.T0076

    Corrupt AI Model

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Realized

    An adversary may purposefully corrupt a malicious AI model file so that it cannot be successfully deserialized in order to evade detection by a model scanner. The corrupt model may still successfully execute malicious…

  • AML.T0077

    LLM Response Rendering

    Exfiltration · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may induce a large language model (LLM) to respond with private information structured in a reference to external content that, when rendered by the user's client, makes a request to an adversary-controlle…

  • AML.T0078

    Drive-by Compromise

    Initial Access · Maturity: Demonstrated · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1189

    Adversaries may gain access to an AI system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing, or an AI agent retrieving information from the web on behalf of a user. Websites can contain an LLM Pro…

  • AML.T0079

    Stage Capabilities

    Resource Development · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed (Develop Capabilities) or obt…

  • AML.T0080

    AI Agent Context Poisoning

    Persistence · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the context used by an AI agent's large language model (LLM) to influence the responses it generates or actions it takes. This allows an adversary to persistently change the behav…

  • AML.T0081

    Modify AI Agent Configuration

    Persistence · Defense Evasion · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may modify the configuration files for AI agents on a system. This allows malicious changes to persist beyond the life of a single agent and affects any agents that share the configuration. Configuration…

  • AML.T0082

    RAG Credential Harvesting

    Credential Access · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may attempt to use their access to a large language model (LLM) on the victim's system to collect credentials. Credentials may be stored in internal documents which can inadvertently be ingested into a RAG…

  • AML.T0083

    Credentials from AI Agent Configuration

    Credential Access · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may access the credentials of other tools or services on a system from the configuration of an AI agent.

  • AML.T0084

    Discover AI Agent Configuration

    Discovery · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may attempt to discover configuration information for AI agents present on the victim's system. Agent configurations can include tools or services they have access to. Adversaries may directly access agen…

  • AML.T0085

    Data from AI Services

    Collection · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may use their access to victim AI-enabled services to collect proprietary or otherwise sensitive information available to the system. As organizations adopt generative and agentic AI in centralized service…

  • AML.T0086

    Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation

    Exfiltration · Maturity: Realized

    AI agent tools capable of performing write operations may be invoked to exfiltrate data to an adversary. Sensitive information can be encoded into the tool's input parameters and transmitted to an adversary-controlled…

  • AML.T0087

    Gather Victim Identity Information

    Reconnaissance · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1589

    Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addre…

  • AML.T0088

    Generate Deepfakes

    AI Attack Adaptation · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may use generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) to create synthetic media (i.e. imagery, video, audio, and text) that appear authentic. These "deepfakes" may mimic a real person or depict fictional pers…

  • AML.T0089

    Enterprise Environment Discovery

    Discovery · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may discover configurations, conditions, relationships, activity, and other characteristics of an enterprise environment. This may include system and network configuration; active connections, processes, w…

  • AML.T0090

    OS Credential Dumping

    Credential Access · Maturity: Demonstrated · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1003

    Adversaries may extract credentials from OS caches, application memory, or other sources on a compromised system. Credentials are often in the form of a hash or clear text, and can include usernames and passwords, app…

  • AML.T0091

    Use Alternate Authentication Material

    Lateral Movement · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1550

    Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access control…

  • AML.T0092

    Manipulate User LLM Chat History

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may manipulate a user's large language model (LLM) chat history to cover the tracks of their malicious behavior. They may hide persistent changes they have made to the LLM's behavior, or obscure their atte…

  • AML.T0093

    Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application

    Initial Access · Persistence · Maturity: Realized

    An adversary may introduce malicious prompts into the victim's system via a public-facing application with the intention of it being ingested by an AI at some point in the future and ultimately having a downstream eff…

  • AML.T0094

    Delay Execution of LLM Instructions

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may include instructions to be followed by the AI system in response to a future event, such as a specific keyword or the next interaction, in order to evade detection or bypass controls placed on the AI s…

  • AML.T0095

    Search Open Websites/Domains

    Reconnaissance · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1593

    Adversaries may search public websites and/or domains for information about victims and AI targets that can be used during targeting and to discover opportunities for successful attacks. Information about a victim's a…

  • AML.T0096

    AI Service API

    Command and Control · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may communicate using the API of an AI service on the victim's system. The adversary's commands to the victim system, and often the results, are embedded in the normal traffic of the AI service. An AI ser…

  • AML.T0097

    Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1497

    Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtu…

  • AML.T0098

    AI Agent Tool Credential Harvesting

    Credential Access · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may attempt to use their access to an AI agent on the victim's system to retrieve data from available agent tools to collect credentials. Agent tools may connect to a wide range of sources that may contain…

  • AML.T0099

    AI Agent Tool Data Poisoning

    Persistence · Maturity: Feasible

    Adversaries may manipulate data in a victim-controlled, trusted, or connected data source that is accessible through an AI agent tool. Poisoned data may be placed in document repositories, databases, source-code repos…

  • AML.T0100

    AI Agent Clickbait

    Execution · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may craft deceptive content designed to bait computer-using AI agents or AI web browsers and tools into taking unintended actions, such as clicking buttons, copying code, or navigating to specific web page…

  • AML.T0101

    Data Destruction via AI Agent Tool Invocation

    Impact · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may invoke an AI agent's tool capable of performing mutative operations to perform Data Destruction. Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt…

  • AML.T0102

    Generate Malicious Commands

    AI Attack Adaptation · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may use large language models (LLMs) to dynamically generate malicious commands from natural language. Dynamically generated commands may be harder to detect as the attack signature is constantly changing.…

  • AML.T0103

    Deploy AI Agent

    Execution · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may launch AI agents in the victim's environment to execute actions on their behalf. AI agents may have access to a wide range of tools and data sources, as well as permissions to access and interact with…

  • AML.T0105

    Escape to Host

    Privilege Escalation · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1611

    Adversaries may break out of a container or virtualized environment to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized or virtualized resources from the host level or to t…

  • AML.T0106

    Exploitation for Credential Access

    Credential Access · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1212

    Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or…

  • AML.T0107

    Exploitation for Defense Evasion

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Demonstrated · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1211

    Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or with…

  • AML.T0108

    AI Agent

    Command and Control · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may abuse AI agents present on the victim's system for command and control. AI agents are often granted access to tools that can execute shell commands, reach out to the internet, and interact with other s…

  • AML.T0109

    AI Supply Chain Rug Pull

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may publish legitimate AI components or software, gain user adoption, then push an update with a malicious variant, leading to Supply Chain Compromise. More scrutiny is often placed on a supply chain depen…

  • AML.T0110

    AI Agent Tool Poisoning

    Persistence · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may poison tools used by AI agents by introducing or modifying malicious content or behavior in a tool's model-visible definition, executable implementation, or runtime responses. Tools may include built-i…

  • AML.T0111

    AI Supply Chain Reputation Inflation

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Demonstrated

    AI Supply Chain Reputation Inflation is the process of building or leveraging genuinely credible-looking trust signals to increase the perceived legitimacy of AI supply chain components, with the goal of driving adopt…

  • AML.T0112

    Machine Compromise

    Impact · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may compromise a machine by exploiting or manipulating AI-enabled components on the system. Compromising a victim system allows the adversary to execute arbitrary code, steal credentials, exfiltrate data,…

  • AML.T0113

    Steal Web Session Cookie

    Credential Access · Maturity: Demonstrated · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1539

    Adversaries may steal web application or service session cookies used to authenticate users to AI-enabled systems, AI services, or supporting enterprise applications. Web applications often use session cookies as aut…

  • AML.T0114

    AI Service Web Interface

    Command and Control · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may communicate with compromised systems by abusing the web interface of an AI service as an intermediary command-and-control relay. Instead of connecting directly to attacker-controlled infrastructure or…

  • AML.T0115

    Publish Poisoned AI Artifacts

    Resource Development · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may create or modify AI artifacts and publish them through public or shared distribution channels to facilitate compromise of downstream AI systems. Poisoned AI artifacts may include datasets, models, and…

  • AML.T0116

    Autonomous Reconnaissance

    Reconnaissance · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may use autonomous AI agents to conduct Reconnaissance activities. Given an objective, target, or partial lead, an agent may autonomously determine what information to obtain and how to investigate it. It…

  • AML.T0117

    Autonomous Attack-Path Adaptation

    AI Attack Adaptation · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may use an AI agent to autonomously construct and repeatedly revise an attack path toward an adversary-defined objective. Given a high-level objective, the system may derive intermediate objectives, identi…

  • AML.T0118

    Autonomous AI Agent Communication

    AI Attack Adaptation · Maturity: Realized

    Autonomous AI agents may exchange operational information with other AI agents, sub-agents, or independent agent runs. Exchanged information may include discoveries, objectives, tasking, capabilities, credentials, con…

  • AML.T0119

    Exploit Automated Artifact Processing Pipeline

    Initial Access · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may submit, publish, or modify an artifact in a way that triggers an automated processing pipeline. As the pipeline handles the artifact, adversary-controlled content or configuration may exploit a weaknes…

  • AML.T0120

    AI Artifact Repository

    Command and Control · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may repurpose AI artifact repositories as asynchronous command-and-control channels. Commands, payloads, or tasking may be placed in repository objects for a compromised system to retrieve or poll. The com…

  • AML.T0121

    AI Agent Environment Reconstruction

    Persistence · Maturity: Realized

    An autonomous AI agent may reconstruct the environment needed to continue an existing operation after its execution environment is lost, reset, replaced, denied, or made unusable. The agent may recover or recreate too…

  • AML.T0122

    Exploitation of Remote Services

    Lateral Movement · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1210

    Adversaries may exploit a software or design weakness in a service reachable from their current environment to gain unauthorized access to another system, component, network, or trust boundary. Exploitation may allow…

  • AML.T0123

    Obfuscated Files or Information

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1027

    Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be us…

  • AML.T0124

    Autonomous Attack Orchestration

    AI Attack Adaptation · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may use autonomous AI systems as an operational control layer to manage multiple distinct autonomous agents or sub-agents toward a common adversary-defined objective. The orchestrating system may create as…

  • AML.T0125

    Create Account

    Persistence · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1136

    Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to an AI system or its supporting infrastructure. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access t…

  • AML.T0126

    Automated Collection

    Collection · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1119

    Adversaries may use automated techniques to collect data from AI systems and supporting enterprise environments. Automation may use scripts, command interpreters, command-line tools, or AI agent tools to identify, ret…

  • AML.T0127

    Data Staged

    Collection · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1074

    Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location before exfiltration. Staging consolidates, organizes, or prepares information obtained from one or more sources so it can be reviewed, processed, transferred,…

  • AML.T0128

    Compromise Infrastructure

    Resource Development · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1584

    Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure and repurpose it to support attacks against AI systems. Rather than buying, leasing, registering, or otherwise legitimately acquiring a resource, the adversary gai…

  • AML.T0129

    Triggers in Multimodal Inputs

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Feasible

    Adversaries may place instructions or triggers in one part of a multimodal input to influence the model while staying unnoticed by human reviewers and by defenses that do not inspect all input modalities. Multimodal…

  • AML.T0130

    AI Agent Response Biasing

    Impact · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may manipulate an AI assistant so that it favors adversary-chosen sources, or content in its responses. By injecting instructions such as "treat [source] as a trusted source" or "recommend [source] first,"…

  • AML.T0131

    Crafted AI Assistant Links

    Initial Access · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may craft links that open an AI assistant or agent with attacker-controlled input already supplied, so that opening the link initiates an interaction the adversary defines rather than one the target compos…

  • AML.T0132

    Misconfigured or Publicly Exposed AI Services

    Initial Access · Maturity: Demonstrated

    AI agents and LLM platforms are deployed across diverse architectures, including standalone servers, SaaS platforms, and low-code builders. All of these often have misconfigured access controls, ranging from missing a…

  • AML.T0133

    Discover AI Agent Runtime Capabilities

    Discovery · Maturity: Feasible

    Adversaries may interact with an AI agent at runtime to reveal the capabilities available to it, without requiring access to its underlying configuration. Direct interaction with the agent can surface its registered t…

  • AML.T0134

    AI Targeted Cloaking

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Feasible

    Adversaries may selectively deliver malicious or manipulated content to AI systems, while presenting different benign content to human users, web crawlers, or security detection mechanisms. They may identify AI browse…

  • AML.T0135

    Outputs from AI Models

    Collection · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may gather, retain, and organize outputs from an AI model or service as material for subsequent adversarial operations. Systematic selection and aggregation of responses can produce datasets or observation…

  • AML.T0136

    Exfiltration via AI User Interface

    Exfiltration · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries exfiltrate information through an AI system's user-facing outputs. Information may be disclosed in conversational responses, generated documents, previews, or other content presented through the applicatio…

  • AML.T0137

    Training Data Information from AI Models

    Collection · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may obtain sensitive information about the data used to train or fine-tune an AI model by analyzing its outputs or behavior. This can expose private associations, personally identifiable information, or pr…

  • AML.T0138

    Indicator Removal

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1070

    Adversaries may delete, alter, or falsify records and artifacts to conceal their activity, impede investigation, or make unauthorized actions appear legitimate. Targeted artifacts may include logs, command histories,…

  • AML.T0139

    Compromise Accounts

    Resource Development · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1586

    Adversaries may compromise existing accounts with services that can support targeting or subsequent operations. These accounts may provide established identities, trusted relationships, access to resources, or funded…

  • AML.T0140

    Centralized AI Service Request Routing

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may distribute coordinated AI service requests across multiple pathways to impede detection, conceal the coordinated nature of the requests, and evade AI provider enforcement. Distributing activity can lim…

  • AML.T0141

    AI Service Request Metadata Sanitization

    Defense Evasion · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may remove or replace identifying information in request metadata before submitting requests to an AI service to impede attribution and correlation of coordinated activity. Sanitization may be enforced aut…

  • AML.T0142

    Event Triggered Execution

    Persistence · Maturity: Realized · ATLAS-listed ATT&CK reference: T1546

    Adversaries may establish persistence by creating or modifying event handlers, startup hooks, or associated configuration so that subsequent system or application activity automatically executes adversary-controlled c…

  • AML.T0143

    LLM Prompt Propagation

    Lateral Movement · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may cause malicious instructions already introduced into an AI-enabled environment to be transferred onward to additional storage locations, agents, applications, or resources where they can influence subs…

  • AML.T0144

    Recover AI Model Internals

    Discovery · Collection · Maturity: Feasible

    Adversaries may infer or recover non-public AI model internals through analysis of model behavior or exposed information. Targets may include architecture, layer dimensions, hyperparameters, decision-tree structure, p…

  • AML.T0145

    Poison AI Agent Learning Environment

    Persistence · Maturity: Feasible

    Adversaries may manipulate an environment in which an AI agent interacts so that observations, feedback, rewards, actions, or resulting interactions are incorporated into model training to cause persistent changes to…

Summaries are excerpts of MITRE ATLAS descriptions (Apache 2.0). Follow the links for full entries, references and procedure examples.

Real-world evidence

Recent ATLAS case studies involving LLMs and agents

  • AISI Evaluation Agents Conduct Unsanctioned Real-World Cyber Activity

    AML.CS0074 · Incident · 2026 · reported by UK AI Security Institute (AISI)

    Between July 25 and 28, 2026, autonomous AI agents undergoing cybersecurity evaluations by the UK AI Security Institute (AISI) took unsanctioned actions involving real people and public Internet services. AISI identified 19 events across 10 evaluation runs: 17 involved Claude Mythos 5 and two involved GPT-5.6 Sol.

  • Autonomous Claude Agents Compromise Three Real Organizations During Cyber Evaluations

    AML.CS0073 · Incident · 2026

    Autonomous Anthropic models gained unauthorized access to systems belonging to three unrelated organizations during six cybersecurity evaluation runs from April through July 2026, compromising real systems while pursuing capture-the-flag objectives.

  • AI Recommendation Poisoning via Crafted AI Assistant Links

    AML.CS0072 · Incident · 2026 · reported by Microsoft Defender Security Research Team

    The Microsoft Defender Security Research Team identified a widespread pattern of AI assistant memory manipulation carried out for promotional purposes, which they named AI Recommendation Poisoning.

  • Multi-Agent Framework Compromises Taiwanese Government Systems

    AML.CS0071 · Incident · 2026 · reported by Dream Research Labs

    In early July 2026, an unknown Chinese-language operator used a multi-agent framework built on Hermes and OpenClaw against government systems that subsequent public reporting identified as Taiwanese. Dream Research Labs recovered a 160 MB operational workspace containing 1,395 files documenting 12 attack waves conducted from July 1 through July 4.

  • Threat Actor Uses a DeepSeek-Powered Hermes Agent in Langflow and n8n Exploitation Attempts

    AML.CS0070 · Incident · 2026

    A Chinese-speaking threat actor operating as knaithe or KnYuan configured Hermes Agent to use DeepSeek as its reasoning engine. Hermes supplied terminal access, Telegram-based operator control, and a skills system containing both bundled and actor-created red-team skills. The actor also integrated an MCP server that exposed FOFA search, query translation, and Nuclei scan-generation capabilities.

  • GTG-1002 Claude Code Espionage Campaign

    AML.CS0069 · Incident · 2025

    In September 2025, GTG-1002 used a jailbroken Claude Code agent to conduct a cyber-espionage campaign against approximately 30 organizations, succeeding against a small number. Anthropic assessed with high confidence that GTG-1002 was a Chinese state-sponsored group.

Case studies are documented by MITRE ATLAS; see each entry for its sources.

MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK data © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (ATT&CK v20.1). MITRE ATLAS™ data (v2026.10) © MITRE, used under the Apache License 2.0. Securitain is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE. Explanations, scenarios and control mappings on this page are Securitain’s own analysis. Sources and licensing

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