Cloud Control Explorer

Which AWS controls matter for which attack technique?

A curated cross-reference between cloud attack techniques and defensive controls. Every relationship states why it matters, its assumptions, the evidence needed to prove the control works and how to validate it.
22 techniques34 controls61 curated relationships

A mapping is not a guarantee

A control listed against a technique is relevant under the stated assumptions. It does not mean the technique is fully mitigated, and it does not mean the control is configured or working in your environment. Relationship types: preventive, restrictive, detective, recovery and supporting.

T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

Securitain guide

Relevant controls, why they matter, and the evidence needed to show they work. A relationship means the control is relevant under its assumptions — not that it fully mitigates the technique.

PreventiveMakes the technique infeasible under the stated assumptions.

  • Phishing-resistant MFA for human privileged access

    CTL-IAM-MFA

    Stolen passwords alone cannot complete an interactive sign-in when MFA is enforced for the account.

    Assumptions
    • Applies to console / IdP sign-in. Does not protect access keys or already-issued session tokens.
    Evidence required
    • IdP or IAM policy showing MFA is required for every privileged human identity
    • Credential report showing mfa_active for remaining IAM users
    How to validate
    Review IdP conditional-access settings and the IAM credential report; attempt a test sign-in without MFA in a non-production account.

RestrictiveLimits scope or impact if the technique is attempted.

  • Replace long-term access keys with temporary credentials

    CTL-IAM-NOKEYS

    Short-lived credentials expire, so a leaked credential is useful for hours rather than indefinitely.

    Assumptions
    • Workloads can use roles or federation instead of IAM user keys.
    Evidence required
    • Inventory of IAM users with active access keys and their owners
    • Justification for each remaining long-term key
    How to validate
    Export the credential report and count active access keys; confirm each is owned and justified.
  • Find and remove unused credentials and permissions

    CTL-IAM-UNUSED

    Dormant users and keys are attractive because nobody notices when they start being used.

    Assumptions
    • Last-used data is reviewed regularly and acted on.
    Evidence required
    • Access Analyzer unused-access findings or last-used reports
    • Ticket history showing removal of stale credentials
    How to validate
    Compare credential-report last-used dates against the review policy (for example 90 days).

DetectiveProduces evidence that may reveal the technique — if someone acts on it.

  • Alerting on identity and logging changes

    CTL-ALERT-IDENTITY

    Alerts on unusual sign-ins, root use and new credentials can surface account misuse early.

    Assumptions
    • Someone owns and triages the alerts.
    • Behavioural detections need baselines; first-use alerts can be noisy.
    Evidence required
    • EventBridge / CloudWatch rules for ConsoleLogin anomalies and root activity
    • Alert routing and on-call ownership
    How to validate
    Trigger a benign test event (for example a sign-in from a test identity) and confirm it reaches the queue.
  • Managed threat detection across accounts and regions

    CTL-GUARDDUTY

    GuardDuty can flag credential use from unusual locations or anonymizing infrastructure.

    Assumptions
    • GuardDuty is enabled in every account and region used, and findings are monitored.
    Evidence required
    • Organization-wide GuardDuty configuration
    • Finding export destination and triage records
    How to validate
    Use GuardDuty sample findings to confirm the alert path end to end.
    GuardDuty finding types Review: reviewed

Control catalog

Identity & access

Organization guardrails

  • Service control policy guardrails

    CTL-ORG-SCP

    Use SCPs to deny actions no workload should perform — for example stopping organization trails, disabling GuardDuty, leaving the organization, or using unapproved regions — regardless of what IAM policies allow.

    AWS: AWS Organizations

    T1098.001T1685.002T1537T1136.003T1496

    Service control policies (SCPs)

  • Resource control policies and data perimeter

    CTL-ORG-RCP

    Use resource control policies and perimeter conditions so supported resources can only be accessed by identities from your organization, from expected networks.

    AWS: AWS Organizations, S3, KMS, Secrets Manager, STS

    T1537

    Resource control policies (RCPs)Related Securitain capability

Logging & detection

  • Organization-wide, tamper-resistant CloudTrail

    CTL-CT-ORG

    Run a multi-region organization trail that delivers to a dedicated log-archive account, with log file integrity validation, restricted bucket access and retention that matches investigation needs.

    AWS: CloudTrail, S3, KMS, AWS Organizations

    T1685.002

    Creating a trail for an organization

  • Selective data-event logging for sensitive resources

    CTL-CT-DATA

    Management events do not show object reads. Enable data events (for example S3 object-level and Lambda invoke events) for the buckets and functions whose access you would need to reconstruct.

    AWS: CloudTrail, S3, Lambda, DynamoDB

    T1530

    Logging data events

  • Alerting on identity and logging changes

    CTL-ALERT-IDENTITY

    Route high-signal events — new access keys, policy attachments, trust-policy changes, trail or detector changes, root activity — to an owned alert queue with a documented response.

    AWS: EventBridge, CloudWatch, CloudTrail, GuardDuty

    T1078.004T1098.001T1098.003T1199T1685.002T1537T1555.006T1136.003T1651T1648

    Creating CloudWatch alarms for CloudTrail events

  • Managed threat detection across accounts and regions

    CTL-GUARDDUTY

    Enable GuardDuty organization-wide, including the protection plans relevant to your workloads (for example S3, EKS and runtime monitoring), and make sure findings reach a monitored destination.

    AWS: GuardDuty

    T1078.004T1580T1685.002T1530T1552.005T1611T1496

    GuardDuty finding types

  • Cost and quota anomaly monitoring

    CTL-COST-ANOMALY

    Unexpected compute or AI-service spend is often the first visible sign of hijacked resources. Monitor cost anomalies and keep service quotas close to real need.

    AWS: Cost Anomaly Detection, Service Quotas, Budgets

    T1496

    Detecting unusual spend with AWS Cost Anomaly Detection

Data protection

Resilience

  • Isolated, immutable backups with tested restores

    CTL-BACKUP-ISOLATION

    Keep backups in a separate account with vault lock or Object Lock so a compromised workload identity cannot delete them, and test restoration on a schedule.

    AWS: AWS Backup, S3 Object Lock

    T1485T1490

    AWS Backup Vault Lock

  • Credential compromise response runbook

    CTL-IR-RUNBOOK

    Document who deactivates keys, revokes active role sessions, preserves evidence and communicates — and rehearse it. Revoking a key does not end sessions already issued from it.

    AWS: IAM, STS, CloudTrail

    T1098.001

    AWS Security Incident Response Guide

Workload identity

  • Enforce IMDSv2 and limit metadata reachability

    CTL-IMDSV2

    Require IMDSv2 session tokens and use a hop limit of 1 where containers should not reach the node metadata service, reducing credential theft through SSRF or container escape.

    AWS: EC2, EKS

    T1552.005T1611

    Configure the instance metadata options

  • Per-workload EKS identities

    CTL-EKS-IDENTITY

    Use EKS Pod Identity or IRSA so each service account receives only its own role, keep the node role minimal, and stop pods from inheriting node credentials.

    AWS: EKS, IAM

    T1528

    Learn how EKS Pod Identity grants pods access to AWS services

  • Least-privilege cluster access and audit logging

    CTL-EKS-RBAC

    Grant cluster access through EKS access entries and narrowly scoped Kubernetes RBAC, avoid broad cluster-admin bindings, and enable control plane audit logs.

    AWS: EKS

    Grant IAM users access to Kubernetes with EKS access entries

  • Restricted pod security settings

    CTL-POD-HARDENING

    Apply the Kubernetes "restricted" Pod Security Standard (no privileged containers, host namespaces or hostPath mounts) so a compromised container cannot trivially reach the node.

    AWS: EKS, ECS

    T1611

    Pod Security Standards

AI agent security

MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK data © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (ATT&CK v20.1). Securitain is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE. Explanations, scenarios and control mappings on this page are Securitain’s own analysis. Sources and licensing

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