MITRE ATT&CK technique · T1698
Indirect Prompt Injection
What is indirect prompt injection? Indirect prompt injection places adversary instructions in content an AI system ingests during normal operation — retrieved documents, emails, web pages, tool output — rather than in the user’s own message. The model may treat that content as instructions.
For leadership
Executive takeaway
How it works in AWS
- The adversary places crafted text where the AI system will read it.
- The system retrieves or receives that content as context.
- The model follows the embedded instructions, possibly invoking tools or emitting data.
What the attacker needs
- The AI system ingests content the adversary can influence
Relevant AWS API calls
| API / event | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| bedrock:Retrieve / RetrieveAndGenerate | Knowledge-base retrieval that may surface poisoned content. |
| bedrock:InvokeAgent | Agents that may act on injected instructions. |
A risky permission is not an observed attack
Agents that read untrusted content and also hold write tools or broad roles.
Tool calls or outputs that follow instructions present in retrieved content.
Preventive and limiting controls
- Treat retrieved content as untrusted; restrict tools after reading it
- Authorization enforced by tools
- Human approval for consequential actions
- Guardrails as defense in depth
Mapped cloud controls
- restrictiveTreat retrieved and tool-returned content as untrusted
Indirect prompt injection depends on the agent acting on instructions hidden in content it retrieves; separating and constraining untrusted content limits that influence.
- preventiveAuthorization enforced by tools, not the model
If tools enforce the end user’s permissions, injected instructions cannot make the agent access data the user could not.
- restrictiveHuman approval for consequential agent actions
Human confirmation of consequential actions interrupts injected instructions before they take effect.
See assumptions and validation evidence in the Cloud Control Explorer →
Detection signals and telemetry
- Instruction-like content in ingestion pipelines — Ingestion scanning
- Tool calls inconsistent with user intent — Agent audit logs
MITRE detection strategies (official, cloud-relevant analytics)
- DET0942 Retrieved Instruction with Unauthorized Agent Action
- AN2293 (SaaS): An analyst observes an AI application retrieve or ingest lower-trust content containing instructions that attempt to redirect the application's behavior. Within the same agent execution context, the AI system subsequently attempts a tool invocation, resource access, or workflow transition outside the actions authorized for the original task or retrieved resource.Log sources: AWS:bedrock — AgentTrace.knowledgeBaseLookupInput; AWS:bedrock — AgentTrace.actionGroupInvocationInput
MITRE mitigations
Official MITRE description (excerpt)
Adversaries may deliver malicious prompts to an LLM indirectly by embedding the prompts in content that the adversary expects may be processed by an LLM. These prompts can be included in web pages, documents, emails, tickets, code, or other sources that an agent, copilot, or other AI system may retrieve and process. When an LLM processes this content, the embedded instructions may cause the system to perform unintended behaviors.
Adversaries may use indirect prompt injection to Impair Autonomous Defenses, and for unauthorized execution of any capabilities available to the LLM.
Common misconceptions
- “A better system prompt prevents injection.”
- System prompts are not a security boundary; injected text competes with them.
AI security
Related MITRE ATLAS techniques
ATLAS and ATT&CK are separate frameworks. These relationships are listed explicitly, with their basis.
- AML.T0051.001 LLM Prompt Injection: IndirectRelated behavior (Securitain analysis) — Both describe instructions delivered through content an AI system ingests rather than through the user. ATLAS models it as an LLM prompt-injection sub-technique; Enterprise ATT&CK models it as an Execution technique.
- AML.T0070 RAG PoisoningRelated AI-specific behavior (Securitain analysis).
Direct and indirect prompt injection →RAG, memory and retrieved-content poisoning →
Attack scenarios using this technique
Indirect prompt injection through retrieved documents
AI agent with excessive AWS permissions
Malicious content influencing an agent’s privileged tool invocation
References
MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK data © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (ATT&CK v20.1). MITRE ATLAS™ data (v2026.10) © MITRE, used under the Apache License 2.0. Securitain is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE. Explanations, scenarios and control mappings on this page are Securitain’s own analysis. Sources and licensing