Cloud environments
In cloud, escalation usually exploits permission relationships rather than software bugs: an identity that can modify policies, pass roles to compute, or change trust can often reach administrator-equivalent access.
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How does privilege escalation work in AWS IAM?
Privilege Escalation covers techniques adversaries use to gain higher permissions than they started with — moving from a user or workload identity to administrative control of a system, an account or an organization.
The adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions.
Privilege Escalation consists of techniques that adversaries use to gain higher-level permissions on a system or network. Adversaries can often enter and explore a network with unprivileged access but require elevated permissions to follow through on their objectives. Common approaches are to take advantage of system weaknesses, misconfigurations, and vulnerabilities. Examples of elevated access include:
* SYSTEM/root level * local administrator * user account with admin-like access * user accounts with access to specific system or perform specific function
These techniques often overlap with Persistence techniques, as OS features that let an adversary persist can execute in an elevated context.
In cloud, escalation usually exploits permission relationships rather than software bugs: an identity that can modify policies, pass roles to compute, or change trust can often reach administrator-equivalent access.
Well-known AWS escalation paths include iam:PassRole with lambda:CreateFunction / ec2:RunInstances / cloudformation:CreateStack, iam:CreatePolicyVersion, iam:AttachUserPolicy, iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy, and modifying IAM Identity Center permission sets. Container escape to a node with a broad instance role is another path.
An AI agent whose tool role can modify IAM, or that can pass roles to compute, becomes an escalation path for anyone who can influence the agent’s input.
iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunctionRun code as a more privileged role.iam:CreatePolicyVersion (--set-as-default)Rewrite a policy already attached to you.iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicyAllow yourself to assume a privileged role.Abuse of elevation mechanisms and role passing for temporary higher privileges.
View on MITRE ATT&CKAttaching policies or roles to identities the adversary controls.
Read the Securitain guideContainer escape to a node holding broader credentials.
Using a more privileged valid account once its credentials are found.
Read the Securitain guideCompute created with privileged roles
Policy version changes and attachments
IAM changes made by compute execution roles
For leadership
The real number of administrators is the number of identities that can become one. Ask for that number, not the length of the admin group.
Myth
“Only identities with AdministratorAccess are admins.”
Reality
Many permission combinations are administrator-equivalent without that policy.
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