TA0042Tactic 2 of 15

Resource Developmentin cloud and AI environments

How do attackers prepare cloud infrastructure for an attack?

ATT&CK v20.1Updated Official tactic page
Resource Development technique map9 techniques in Resource Development, 0 of them apply to cloud platforms. Highlighted: T1586.003, T1583, T1608, T1588.T1583T1586T1588T1608TA00429 TECHNIQUES
Key for cloud (this guide)Applies to cloud platformsOther platforms
9
Techniques
42
Sub-techniques
0
Apply to cloud platforms
3
Defensive controls
2
Detection signals

What the tactic means

Resource Development covers what the adversary builds, buys or compromises for later use: infrastructure, accounts, tools and capabilities. It mostly happens outside your environment, which means defenders rarely see it directly — but it determines what the adversary can do once they arrive.

The adversary is trying to establish resources they can use to support operations.

Resource Development consists of techniques that involve adversaries creating, purchasing, or compromising/stealing resources that can be used to support targeting. Such resources include infrastructure, accounts, or capabilities. These resources can be leveraged by the adversary to aid in other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as using purchased domains to support Command and Control, email accounts for phishing as a part of Initial Access, or stealing code signing certificates to help with Defense Evasion.

MITRE ATT&CK TA0042 description

Why it matters: cloud, AWS and AI

Cloud environments

Adversaries use their own or compromised cloud accounts to host infrastructure, receive exfiltrated data (for example a bucket in an adversary account) or stage malicious images. Attacks launched from major cloud providers’ IP ranges blend in with legitimate traffic.

AWS specifics

An adversary may create an AWS account to receive shared snapshots, or compromise a third party’s account that you already trust. Trust policies that name whole external accounts turn that third party’s compromise into your exposure.

AI & workloads

Adversaries obtain AI capabilities — models, generated phishing content, malicious tool packages — and may publish poisoned models, datasets or agent tools for victims to adopt.

What the attacker is trying to achieve

  1. 01Acquire infrastructure that looks legitimate
  2. 02Compromise accounts that the target trusts
  3. 03Stage payloads, images or tooling
  4. 04Prepare destinations for exfiltrated data

Techniques that matter most in cloud

What it needs, and what breaks it

Attacker needs

  • Generally none in your environment; this happens elsewhere

Defenders control

  • Restrict trust and sharing to known accounts
  • Data-perimeter controls so data can only move to your organization
  • Supply-chain review for images, packages, models and agent tools

Detection signals and telemetry

Signal
  • Sharing or replication targets that are unknown accounts

    CloudTrail management events
  • New external principals in trust policies

    IAM Access Analyzer external access findings

For leadership

What this means for the business

You cannot stop an adversary from preparing, but you can make prepared infrastructure useless: data should not be able to leave to unknown accounts, and third-party trust should be explicit and narrow.

Common misconceptions

Myth

“Traffic from AWS IP ranges is trustworthy.”

Reality

Anyone can run infrastructure in public cloud. Provider IP ranges are not an indicator of legitimacy.

Practical security checklist

0 of 3 done

Saved only in this browser. Nothing is sent to Securitain.

Related attack scenarios

Where Securitain fits

  • Securitain can assess todayRisky trust relationship analysis, including roles trusted by external accounts and missing or unscoped ExternalId. Learn more
  • Securitain can assess todayPublic and cross-account exposure checks on S3, KMS, SQS, SNS and Secrets Manager resource policies. Learn more

Official sources and references

MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK data © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (ATT&CK v20.1). Securitain is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE. Explanations, scenarios and control mappings on this page are Securitain’s own analysis. Sources and licensing

Stay in the loop

Cloud security insights, early access & compliance updates

Weekly InsightsEarly AccessExpert Content
No spam, everUnsubscribe anytimeWeekly updates
Chat with Securitain