Key for cloud (this guide)Applies to cloud platformsOther platforms
9
Techniques
42
Sub-techniques
0
Apply to cloud platforms
3
Defensive controls
2
Detection signals
What the tactic means
Resource Development covers what the adversary builds, buys or compromises for later use: infrastructure, accounts, tools and capabilities. It mostly happens outside your environment, which means defenders rarely see it directly — but it determines what the adversary can do once they arrive.
“
The adversary is trying to establish resources they can use to support operations.
Resource Development consists of techniques that involve adversaries creating, purchasing, or compromising/stealing resources that can be used to support targeting. Such resources include infrastructure, accounts, or capabilities. These resources can be leveraged by the adversary to aid in other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as using purchased domains to support Command and Control, email accounts for phishing as a part of Initial Access, or stealing code signing certificates to help with Defense Evasion.
Why it matters: cloud, AWS and AI
Cloud environments
Adversaries use their own or compromised cloud accounts to host infrastructure, receive exfiltrated data (for example a bucket in an adversary account) or stage malicious images. Attacks launched from major cloud providers’ IP ranges blend in with legitimate traffic.
AWS specifics
An adversary may create an AWS account to receive shared snapshots, or compromise a third party’s account that you already trust. Trust policies that name whole external accounts turn that third party’s compromise into your exposure.
AI & workloads
Adversaries obtain AI capabilities — models, generated phishing content, malicious tool packages — and may publish poisoned models, datasets or agent tools for victims to adopt.
Generally none in your environment; this happens elsewhere
Defenders control
Restrict trust and sharing to known accounts
Data-perimeter controls so data can only move to your organization
Supply-chain review for images, packages, models and agent tools
Detection signals and telemetry
SignalSource
Sharing or replication targets that are unknown accounts
CloudTrail management events
New external principals in trust policies
IAM Access Analyzer external access findings
For leadership
What this means for the business
You cannot stop an adversary from preparing, but you can make prepared infrastructure useless: data should not be able to leave to unknown accounts, and third-party trust should be explicit and narrow.
Common misconceptions
Myth
“Traffic from AWS IP ranges is trustworthy.”
Reality
Anyone can run infrastructure in public cloud. Provider IP ranges are not an indicator of legitimacy.
Practical security checklist
0%
0 of 3 done
Saved only in this browser. Nothing is sent to Securitain.
Securitain can assess todayRisky trust relationship analysis, including roles trusted by external accounts and missing or unscoped ExternalId. Learn more
Securitain can assess todayPublic and cross-account exposure checks on S3, KMS, SQS, SNS and Secrets Manager resource policies. Learn more