Cloud environments
With sufficient permissions, cloud resources and backups can be deleted in minutes, data can be re-encrypted with keys the adversary controls, and compute can be consumed for the adversary’s benefit.
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What damage can attackers do in an AWS account?
Impact covers techniques that manipulate, interrupt or destroy systems and data — the point where an intrusion becomes direct business harm. It includes destruction, encryption for ransom, denial of service, account lockout and the theft of computing resources for the adversary’s own use.
The adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your systems and data.
Impact consists of techniques that adversaries use to disrupt availability or compromise integrity by manipulating business and operational processes. Techniques used for impact can include destroying or tampering with data. In some cases, business processes can look fine, but may have been altered to benefit the adversaries’ goals. These techniques might be used by adversaries to follow through on their end goal or to provide cover for a confidentiality breach.
With sufficient permissions, cloud resources and backups can be deleted in minutes, data can be re-encrypted with keys the adversary controls, and compute can be consumed for the adversary’s benefit.
Deleting S3 objects and versions, EBS snapshots and AWS Backup recovery points; scheduling KMS key deletion; removing administrator access; and launching GPU fleets are typical AWS impact actions.
Agents with delete or write tools can cause impact on an adversary’s behalf; consumption of paid AI model capacity is a form of resource hijacking.
kms:ScheduleKeyDeletionMake encrypted data unrecoverable after the waiting period.backup:DeleteRecoveryPointRemove backups.Data destruction.
Encryption for impact (including with attacker-controlled keys).
Removing backups and snapshots to block recovery.
Resource hijacking for mining or AI compute.
Removing account access for legitimate administrators.
Mass deletion or key deletion scheduling
Spend anomalies
For leadership
Recoverability is a design property. Ask when a restore from isolated backups was last tested and whether any single identity can delete both production data and its backups.
Myth
“Snapshots in the same account are backups.”
Reality
If the attacker can delete production, they can usually delete same-account snapshots too.
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