Use stolen credentials
The key is validated and permissions probed.
- Preconditions
- Active key
- Required access
- Key.
- Potential evidence
- CloudTrail from unfamiliar infrastructure
- Defensive controls
- Short-lived credentials
Attack scenario · Kubernetes & infrastructure
How do attackers abuse AWS accounts for cryptomining or AI compute? Stolen credentials are used to launch large GPU or compute fleets — often in regions the company never uses — leaving the victim with the bill.
Attack path · 3 stages
Use stolen credentials
T1078.004
Move to unused regions
T1535
Launch compute for the adversary’s use
T1496
For leadership
Not every attacker wants your data. Many simply want your compute — to mine cryptocurrency, run their own workloads, or consume paid AI model capacity — and you pay for it. Because these attacks often run in regions you never use, they may only be noticed when the bill arrives. Simple measures — denying unused regions, keeping service quotas realistic and alerting on unusual spend — limit both the likelihood and the financial impact. Resource hijacking should also be treated as evidence of a wider credential compromise: whoever launched the instances held working credentials and may have used them for other purposes too.
For engineers
With ec2:RunInstances (or Lambda, ECS, Bedrock invoke permissions) an adversary launches resources for their own use (T1496). Unused regions (T1535) and quota increase requests are common accompaniments.
Fictional company: a leaked developer access key has ec2:* in a sandbox account with default service quotas. No region restrictions exist.
Interactive
Select a stage, or use the arrow keys, to see preconditions, evidence and controls.
The key is validated and permissions probed.
| ID | Technique | Tactics (official) | Stages |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Stealth | 1 |
| T1535 | Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions | Stealth | 2 |
| T1496 | Resource Hijacking | Impact | 3 |
Technique names and tactic assignments come from the imported MITRE data. Mapping a stage to a technique is Securitain’s analysis.
SCP region and instance-family restrictions.
Control: Service control policy guardrails · AWS documentation
Daily anomaly alerts to an owned channel.
Control: Cost and quota anomaly monitoring · AWS documentation
Including regions you do not use.
Control: Managed threat detection across accounts and regions · AWS documentation
Prefer short-lived credentials.
Control: Replace long-term access keys with temporary credentials · AWS documentation
| Signal | Telemetry source | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Compute launches in unused regions | Multi-region CloudTrail | — |
| Spend anomalies | Cost Anomaly Detection | — |
| Mining-related network activity | GuardDuty | — |
Telemetry only helps if it is enabled before the incident and someone acts on it. Listing a signal here does not mean it is collected or monitored in your environment.
For leadership
No financial loss estimates are given; impact depends on the data, contracts and regulation involved.
MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK data © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (ATT&CK v20.1). Securitain is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE. Explanations, scenarios and control mappings on this page are Securitain’s own analysis. Sources and licensing
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