MITRE ATT&CK technique · T1078.004
Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
How are valid cloud accounts abused in AWS attacks? Adversaries use legitimate cloud identities — stolen access keys, phished federated sessions, abused roles — so that their activity is authorized by design. Because every API call is technically permitted, defenders must rely on context (who, from where, doing what) rather than on blocked actions.
For leadership
Executive takeaway
How it works in AWS
- A credential is obtained through phishing, leaks in code or images, malware on a developer device, or a compromised third party.
- The adversary validates it (sts:GetCallerIdentity) and explores what it can access.
- Because the identity is legitimate, the activity is logged as normal API use; only context reveals it.
Sub-technique of T1078 Valid Accounts.
What the attacker needs
- A usable credential or session
- No network or device conditions blocking its use
Relevant AWS API calls
| API / event | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| sts:GetCallerIdentity | Validate a credential; requires no permissions. |
| sts:AssumeRole | Move from one identity to another through trust. |
| ConsoleLogin (CloudTrail event) | Console sign-ins, including whether MFA was used. |
A risky permission is not an observed attack
Active access keys older than policy, users without MFA, identities with broad permissions and no recent use.
A credential used from a new ASN or country, GetCallerIdentity followed by enumeration bursts, sign-in without expected MFA context.
Preventive and limiting controls
- Phishing-resistant MFA for humans
- Replace IAM user keys with roles and federation
- Retire unused identities
- Restrict credential use by network where feasible (aws:SourceIp, aws:SourceVpce)
Mapped cloud controls
- preventivePhishing-resistant MFA for human privileged access
Stolen passwords alone cannot complete an interactive sign-in when MFA is enforced for the account.
- restrictiveReplace long-term access keys with temporary credentials
Short-lived credentials expire, so a leaked credential is useful for hours rather than indefinitely.
- restrictiveFind and remove unused credentials and permissions
Dormant users and keys are attractive because nobody notices when they start being used.
- detectiveAlerting on identity and logging changes
Alerts on unusual sign-ins, root use and new credentials can surface account misuse early.
- detectiveManaged threat detection across accounts and regions
GuardDuty can flag credential use from unusual locations or anonymizing infrastructure.
See assumptions and validation evidence in the Cloud Control Explorer →
Detection signals and telemetry
- First use of an identity from a new network or user agent — CloudTrail; GuardDuty
- Root user activity — CloudTrail
- Dormant identity suddenly active — IAM last-used data; CloudTrail
MITRE detection strategies (official, cloud-relevant analytics)
- DET0546 Detection of Abused or Compromised Cloud Accounts for Access and Persistence
- AN1503 (Identity Provider): Detects anomalous authentication activity such as sign-ins from impossible geolocations or legacy protocols from high-privileged accounts.Log sources: azure:signinlogs — Sign-in activity; saas:okta — user.authentication.sso
- AN1504 (IaaS): Detects cloud account use for API calls that exceed normal scope, such as IAM changes or access to services never used before.Log sources: AWS:CloudTrail — ConsoleLogin, AssumeRole, ListAccessKeys, CreateUser; gcp:audit — admin.googleapis.com
- AN1505 (SaaS): Detects unexpected access or usage of cloud productivity tools (e.g., downloading large numbers of files, creating external shares) by internal users.Log sources: m365:unified — FileAccessed, SharingSet; gcp:audit — drive.activity
- AN1506 (Office Suite): Detects login and usage patterns deviating from typical Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace user profiles.Log sources: m365:signinlogs — UserLogin; gcp:audit — login.event
MITRE mitigations
Official MITRE description (excerpt)
Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.
Common misconceptions
- “Logged activity from a valid user is legitimate.”
- Authorization is not intent. Context and baselines are required.
AI security
Related MITRE ATLAS techniques
ATLAS and ATT&CK are separate frameworks. These relationships are listed explicitly, with their basis.
- AML.T0012 Valid AccountsRelated AI-specific behavior (Securitain analysis).
Agent identity, permissions and credential exposure →Model and AI service access management →
Attack scenarios using this technique
Compromised AWS access key
Dangerous cross-account role trust
Cloud credential persistence
Privilege escalation through IAM policy relationships
Compromised deployment pipeline role
Exposed machine identity credentials
AWS IAM Identity Center permission misuse
Cross-account data movement
CloudTrail logging impairment
Compromised EKS service account
Overprivileged infrastructure automation
Resource hijacking and unauthorized compute use
AI agent with excessive AWS permissions
References
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