TA0001Tactic 3 of 15

Initial Accessin cloud and AI environments

How do attackers first get into an AWS environment?

ATT&CK v20.1Updated Official tactic page
Initial Access technique map11 techniques in Initial Access, 7 of them apply to cloud platforms. Highlighted: T1078.004, T1199, T1190, T1195.002, T1566.T1078T1190T1195T1199T1566TA000111 TECHNIQUES
Key for cloud (this guide)Applies to cloud platformsOther platforms
11
Techniques
11
Sub-techniques
7
Apply to cloud platforms
5
Defensive controls
3
Detection signals

What the tactic means

Initial Access covers the techniques an adversary uses to first gain the ability to act inside your environment. The foothold may be narrow at first, but it decides which identities, systems and trust relationships are within reach for every step that follows.

The adversary is trying to get into your network.

Initial Access consists of techniques that use various entry vectors to gain their initial foothold within a network. Techniques used to gain a foothold include targeted spearphishing and exploiting weaknesses on public-facing web servers. Footholds gained through initial access may allow for continued access, like valid accounts and use of external remote services, or may be limited-use due to changing passwords.

MITRE ATT&CK TA0001 description

Why it matters: cloud, AWS and AI

Cloud environments

In cloud, initial access is dominated by identity: stolen or leaked credentials, abused trust relationships and federated sign-in. Exploiting public applications remains common, with the workload’s cloud role determining what follows.

AWS specifics

Leaked IAM access keys, phished federated sessions, cross-account roles with broad trust, CI/CD OIDC trust misconfiguration and vulnerable internet-facing workloads (whose instance or task role is then used) are the dominant entry points.

AI & workloads

Public-facing AI assistants are a new entry surface: prompt injection through user input or ingested content can give an adversary influence over an agent’s tools without any credential theft.

AWS API calls to know
  • sts:GetCallerIdentityOften the first call made with a stolen credential to validate it.
  • sts:AssumeRole / AssumeRoleWithWebIdentityEntry through cross-account or CI/CD federation trust.

What the attacker is trying to achieve

  1. 01Obtain valid credentials or sessions
  2. 02Abuse existing trust between accounts or vendors
  3. 03Exploit internet-facing applications to obtain workload roles

Techniques that matter most in cloud

What it needs, and what breaks it

Attacker needs

  • Exposed credential, broad trust, or exploitable public workload

Defenders control

  • Phishing-resistant MFA for humans
  • Eliminate long-term access keys
  • Scoped trust with ExternalId / organization conditions
  • Least-privilege workload roles and IMDSv2
  • Constrained CI/CD OIDC trust

Detection signals and telemetry

Signal
  • Credential use from new networks or user agents

    CloudTrailGuardDuty
  • AssumeRole from unknown external accounts

    CloudTrail
  • Workload credentials used outside their workload

    GuardDuty

For leadership

What this means for the business

Identity is the perimeter in cloud. Investment in MFA, removal of long-lived keys and review of third-party trust usually reduces initial-access risk more than network controls.

Common misconceptions

Myth

“MFA protects our AWS access keys.”

Reality

MFA protects interactive sign-in. Access keys work without MFA unless policies require MFA conditions for specific actions.

Myth

“A firewall stops cloud intrusions.”

Reality

Cloud APIs are reachable from the internet by design; possession of a valid credential is usually sufficient.

Practical security checklist

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Related attack scenarios

Where Securitain fits

  • Securitain can assess todayInventory of IAM users, roles, groups, policies, access-key configuration and trust relationships across connected AWS accounts. Learn more
  • Securitain can assess todayCredential prioritization — surfacing access keys and identities whose permissions make a leak more damaging. Learn more
  • Securitain can assess todayRisky trust relationship analysis, including roles trusted by external accounts and missing or unscoped ExternalId. Learn more

Official sources and references

MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK data © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (ATT&CK v20.1). Securitain is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE. Explanations, scenarios and control mappings on this page are Securitain’s own analysis. Sources and licensing

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