Exploit the application
A vulnerability allows command execution or SSRF in the portal.
- Preconditions
- Exploitable vulnerability
- Required access
- Internet.
- Potential evidence
- WAF / application logs
- Defensive controls
- Patch management, WAF
Attack scenario · Data security
Can a compromised application read data it was never meant to access? A web application vulnerability gives an adversary the application’s AWS role — which can read far more data than the application uses.
Attack path · 4 stages
Exploit the application
T1190
Obtain the workload role
T1552.005T1528
Enumerate data stores
T1580T1619
Read unrelated data
T1530
For leadership
When an internet-facing application is compromised, the damage is defined by what that application’s cloud identity is allowed to do. Many applications run with permissions that include every table and bucket in the account because it was simpler at launch. That converts an ordinary application bug into a large data incident. Reducing each workload’s access to the specific data it serves is one of the highest-value, lowest-cost security investments available. It does not prevent the application bug, but it changes the outcome from "everything in the account was reachable" to "only this service’s own data was at risk" — a very different conversation with customers and regulators.
For engineers
Server-side request forgery against IMDSv1, or remote code execution in the container, yields the task or instance role credentials. Those credentials work wherever the role’s policies and the resource policies allow.
Fictional company: a public customer portal runs on ECS. Its task role has dynamodb:* and s3:GetObject on all resources. The portal only uses one DynamoDB table and one bucket.
Interactive
Select a stage, or use the arrow keys, to see preconditions, evidence and controls.
A vulnerability allows command execution or SSRF in the portal.
| ID | Technique | Tactics (official) | Stages |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Initial Access | 1 |
| T1552.005 | Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API | Credential Access | 2 |
| T1528 | Steal Application Access Token | Credential Access | 2 |
| T1580 | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | Discovery | 3 |
| T1619 | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | Discovery | 3 |
| T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage | Collection | 4 |
Technique names and tactic assignments come from the imported MITRE data. Mapping a stage to a technique is Securitain’s analysis.
Grant only the tables, buckets and actions the application uses.
Control: Least-privilege identity policies · AWS documentation
Require IMDSv2; limit SSRF reachability.
Control: Enforce IMDSv2 and limit metadata reachability · AWS documentation
Use aws:SourceVpce / data perimeter conditions on sensitive stores.
Control: Resource control policies and data perimeter · AWS documentation
| Signal | Telemetry source | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Workload role used from outside its VPC | GuardDuty; CloudTrail sourceIPAddress / vpcEndpointId | — |
| Workload role accessing data stores it never used before | CloudTrail data events | — |
Telemetry only helps if it is enabled before the incident and someone acts on it. Listing a signal here does not mean it is collected or monitored in your environment.
For leadership
No financial loss estimates are given; impact depends on the data, contracts and regulation involved.
MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK data © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (ATT&CK v20.1). Securitain is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE. Explanations, scenarios and control mappings on this page are Securitain’s own analysis. Sources and licensing
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