MITRE ATT&CK technique · T1530

Data from Cloud Storage

How do attackers steal data from Amazon S3? Adversaries read data from cloud object storage using either misconfigured public / cross-account access or permissions held by a compromised identity. The reads are ordinary GetObject calls.

CollectionPlatforms: IaaS, Office Suite, SaaSATT&CK v20.1 · source modified · View on MITRE ATT&CK

For leadership

Executive takeaway

Knowing where sensitive data lives, who can read it, and whether reads are logged is the foundation for both prevention and breach scoping.

How it works in AWS

  1. Find buckets through discovery or public references.
  2. List and read objects with available permissions.
  3. Prefer backups, exports and data-lake prefixes for maximum value.

What the attacker needs

  • s3:GetObject via identity or resource policy
  • kms:Decrypt if objects use customer managed keys

Relevant AWS API calls

AWS API calls relevant to T1530
API / eventWhy it matters
s3:ListBucketList object keys.
s3:GetObjectRead object content (data event).

A risky permission is not an observed attack

Potential exposure

Public or cross-account bucket grants; identities with s3:* on all buckets.

Observed behavior

Bulk GetObject by an identity, access from unknown accounts or anonymous principals.

Preventive and limiting controls

  • Account-level Block Public Access
  • Restrictive bucket policies and data perimeter
  • SSE-KMS with scoped key policies

Mapped cloud controls

  • preventiveS3 Block Public Access at account level

    Block Public Access stops reads that rely on public bucket policies or ACLs, including anonymous internet access and cross-account access granted through a public policy.

  • restrictiveRestrictive bucket and resource policies

    Bucket policies that restrict principals and require organization membership limit who can read data even with valid credentials elsewhere.

  • restrictiveCustomer managed keys with separated key policies

    With SSE-KMS customer managed keys, reading objects also requires kms:Decrypt, adding a second, separately governed permission.

  • detectiveSelective data-event logging for sensitive resources

    Object-level reads are invisible without S3 data events; with them, bulk GetObject activity can be reconstructed and alerted on.

  • detectiveManaged threat detection across accounts and regions

    GuardDuty S3 Protection analyses data events for anomalous access patterns.

See assumptions and validation evidence in the Cloud Control Explorer →

Detection signals and telemetry

  • Object-level access anomalies — S3 data events; GuardDuty S3 Protection
  • External access findings — IAM Access Analyzer

MITRE detection strategies (official, cloud-relevant analytics)

  • DET0484 Multi-Platform Cloud Storage Exfiltration Behavior Chain
    • AN1328 (IaaS): Spike in object access from new IAM user or role followed by data exfiltration to external IPsLog sources: AWS:CloudTrail — GetObject, CopyObject; AWS:CloudTrail — AssumeRole; AWS:VPCFlowLogs — Unusual volume of data transferred from S3 storage endpoints to non-corporate IPs
    • AN1329 (SaaS): OAuth token granted to external app followed by download of high-volume files in OneDrive/Google DriveLog sources: m365:unified — FileAccessed, FileDownloaded, ConsentGranted
    • AN1330 (Office Suite): Internal user account accesses shared links outside org followed by mass file downloadLog sources: m365:sharepoint — AnonymousLinkCreated, FileDownloaded; azure:signinlogs — SigninSuccess

MITRE mitigations

Official MITRE description (excerpt)

Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.

Many IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform.

Common misconceptions

“Encryption at rest stops data theft.”
SSE-S3 decrypts transparently for anyone with read access; only KMS key policies add a separate control.

Attack scenarios using this technique

Compromised AWS access key

A long-lived IAM user access key leaks from a developer laptop or repository and is used to explore the account, add persistence and read data.
Scenario

Dangerous cross-account role trust

A role trusts an entire external account without conditions. When that account is compromised, the adversary walks straight into yours.
Scenario

Excessive IAM permissions

Broad, wildcard permissions granted for convenience turn any compromise of a low-value workload into access to high-value systems.
Scenario

Privilege escalation through IAM policy relationships

A developer role that can pass roles to Lambda and create functions can run code as a far more privileged role — without ever being granted administrator rights directly.
Scenario

Compromised deployment pipeline role

A CI/CD system that deploys to production with a broad role becomes a path from a code repository to production infrastructure.
Scenario

Exposed machine identity credentials

Service credentials embedded in a container image, environment variable or log file are harvested and reused from outside the organization.
Scenario

Sensitive S3 data exposure

Sensitive exports land in a bucket whose policy allows broad or cross-account reads, and are found and copied by someone outside the company.
Scenario

CloudTrail logging impairment

Before acting, an adversary with administrative rights stops or narrows CloudTrail logging so that later activity leaves little evidence.
Scenario

Sensitive data access through an overprivileged workload role

A web application vulnerability gives an adversary the application’s AWS role — which can read far more data than the application uses.
Scenario

Compromised EKS service account

A pod’s service account token is stolen; through Kubernetes RBAC and the IAM role mapped to it, the adversary reaches both the cluster and AWS.
Scenario

Container-to-cloud identity exposure

A privileged container escapes to its node and uses the node’s IAM role, which is far more powerful than any single workload’s.
Scenario

AI agent with excessive AWS permissions

An operations agent that can call AWS APIs runs under a broad role. Manipulated input causes it to make changes no human approved.
Scenario

References

MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK data © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (ATT&CK v20.1). Securitain is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE. Explanations, scenarios and control mappings on this page are Securitain’s own analysis. Sources and licensing

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