Cloud environments
Cloud persistence is mostly identity persistence: additional credentials, new principals and modified trust. It survives because responders revoke what they know about and miss the rest.
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How do attackers maintain access to an AWS account?
Persistence covers techniques adversaries use to keep access across credential rotations, restarts, redeployments and partial remediation. It is why an incident is not over when the first compromised credential is disabled.
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold.
Persistence consists of techniques that adversaries use to keep access to systems across restarts, changed credentials, and other interruptions that could cut off their access. Techniques used for persistence include any access, action, or configuration changes that let them maintain their foothold on systems, such as replacing or hijacking legitimate code or adding startup code.
Cloud persistence is mostly identity persistence: additional credentials, new principals and modified trust. It survives because responders revoke what they know about and miss the rest.
Creating access keys or login profiles for other users, creating roles trusting external accounts, attaching policies, adding OIDC/SAML providers, implanting images in ECR or AMIs, and scheduling functions are typical AWS persistence methods.
AI systems add persistence surfaces: poisoned knowledge-base content, modified agent configuration or memory, and malicious tools installed into agent environments.
iam:CreateAccessKey / CreateLoginProfileAdd credentials to existing users.iam:CreateRole / UpdateAssumeRolePolicyCreate or modify trust for external access.iam:CreateOpenIDConnectProvider / CreateSAMLProviderAdd an identity provider the adversary controls.Extra keys on other users survive revocation of the original key.
Read the Securitain guidePolicy and trust changes create durable privileged access.
Read the Securitain guideNew cloud accounts or roles blend in with legitimate identities.
View on MITRE ATT&CKImplanted images reintroduce access whenever workloads restart.
Valid accounts double as persistence when unnoticed.
Read the Securitain guideCreateAccessKey, CreateUser, CreateRole, CreateLoginProfile
Trust policies granting unknown external principals
New identity providers
For leadership
An incident is only over when every foothold is removed. Ask responders for evidence that all identity changes during the intrusion window were reviewed — not just that the leaked key was rotated.
Myth
“Rotating the leaked key ends the incident.”
Reality
Additional credentials, roles and active sessions remain unless explicitly found and revoked.
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