Cloud environments
In cloud, lateral movement is mostly identity-based: assuming roles across accounts, reusing tokens, and pivoting from workloads into control planes. Network adjacency matters less than trust relationships.
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How do attackers move between AWS accounts and services?
Lateral Movement covers techniques adversaries use to move from the system or account they first compromised to the ones they actually want — usually where valuable data or administrative control lives. It typically reuses credentials and trust relationships rather than exploiting new vulnerabilities.
The adversary is trying to move through your environment.
Lateral Movement consists of techniques that adversaries use to enter and control remote systems on a network. Following through on their primary objective often requires exploring the network to find their target, then pivoting through multiple systems and accounts to gain access to it. Adversaries might install their own remote access tools to accomplish Lateral Movement or use legitimate credentials with native network and operating system tools, which may be stealthier.
In cloud, lateral movement is mostly identity-based: assuming roles across accounts, reusing tokens, and pivoting from workloads into control planes. Network adjacency matters less than trust relationships.
sts:AssumeRole chains across accounts, IAM Identity Center sign-ins, EC2 Instance Connect / SSM sessions, and reuse of application tokens are the main paths.
Agents connected to multiple systems (ticketing, cloud, code) can carry an adversary’s influence from one system into another — ATLAS includes lateral movement via AI agent tool invocation.
sts:AssumeRoleHop into another account through role trust.ec2-instance-connect:SendSSHPublicKeyPush a temporary SSH key to an instance.Signing into cloud services with valid credentials.
View on MITRE ATT&CKDirect connections to cloud VMs (for example via instance-connect or serial console).
View on MITRE ATT&CKReusing application access tokens.
View on MITRE ATT&CKRole-chaining across accounts outside normal patterns
SendSSHPublicKey / StartSession by unusual principals
For leadership
Multi-account structures only contain incidents if trust between accounts is deliberate. Ask which accounts can reach production and why.
Myth
“Separate accounts are fully isolated.”
Reality
Cross-account roles, shared services and Identity Center assignments connect them.
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