MITRE ATT&CK technique · T1098.003
Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles
How do attackers grant themselves additional AWS roles and permissions? Adversaries with IAM write permissions attach policies to identities they control, add themselves to privileged groups, modify role trust policies or change IAM Identity Center permission sets — gaining durable, elevated access that looks like normal administration.
For leadership
Executive takeaway
How it works in AWS
- Attach AdministratorAccess (or an inline policy) to a controlled user or role.
- Modify a privileged role’s trust policy to allow an external or controlled principal.
- Modify an Identity Center permission set and its assignments.
Sub-technique of T1098 Account Manipulation.
What the attacker needs
- iam:Attach*Policy / Put*Policy / UpdateAssumeRolePolicy / AddUserToGroup, or sso:* administration
Relevant AWS API calls
| API / event | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| iam:AttachRolePolicy / AttachUserPolicy | Attach managed policies. |
| iam:PutRolePolicy | Add inline policies (harder to spot in console views). |
| iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy | Change who can assume a role. |
| iam:CreatePolicyVersion | Rewrite an existing policy and set it as default. |
A risky permission is not an observed attack
Identities outside the platform team able to modify policies or trust; no permission boundaries on delegated role creation.
Policy attachments or trust changes outside change windows or not originating from IaC pipeline roles.
Preventive and limiting controls
- Least-privilege IAM administration
- Permission boundaries
- SCPs restricting external trust
- IaC-only change process for IAM
Mapped cloud controls
- preventiveLeast-privilege identity policies
Attaching policies or changing trust requires iam:Attach*/Put*Policy or iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy permissions.
- restrictivePermission boundaries for delegated administration
If delegated administrators must attach a boundary, new or modified roles cannot exceed the approved maximum.
- detectiveAlerting on identity and logging changes
AttachRolePolicy, PutRolePolicy, CreatePolicyVersion and UpdateAssumeRolePolicy are visible in CloudTrail.
See assumptions and validation evidence in the Cloud Control Explorer →
Detection signals and telemetry
- Attach/Put policy, CreatePolicyVersion, UpdateAssumeRolePolicy — CloudTrail management events
- New external principals in trust policies — IAM Access Analyzer
MITRE detection strategies (official, cloud-relevant analytics)
- DET0277 Detection Strategy for Role Addition to Cloud Accounts
- AN0771 (IaaS): Detection of new IAM roles or policies attached to a user/service in AWS/GCP/Azure outside normal patterns or hours, often following account compromise.Log sources: AWS:CloudTrail — AttachUserPolicy, CreatePolicyVersion, PutRolePolicy
- AN0772 (Identity Provider): Behavioral chain of a user being granted elevated privileges or roles in Entra ID or Okta following suspicious login or account creation activity.Log sources: m365:audit — Add member to role, Add app role assignment
- AN0773 (Office Suite): Detection of new admin or role assignment actions within Microsoft 365/O365 environments to elevate access for persistence or lateral movement.Log sources: m365:unified — Add member to role, Set-Mailbox
MITRE mitigations
Official MITRE description (excerpt)
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).
Common misconceptions
- “Inline policies are less important than managed ones.”
- Inline policies grant permissions just the same and are often reviewed less.
Attack scenarios using this technique
Compromised AWS access key
Cloud credential persistence
Privilege escalation through IAM policy relationships
Compromised deployment pipeline role
AWS IAM Identity Center permission misuse
Overprivileged infrastructure automation
AI agent with excessive AWS permissions
References
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