Attack scenario · Data security

Cross-account data movement

How can attackers move data to another AWS account? Rather than downloading data, an adversary shares snapshots or replicates buckets to an account they control — fast, quiet and inside AWS.

Fictional, educational scenarioData exposureLast updated · ATT&CK v20.1

Attack path · 3 stages

  1. 1

    Operate with a privileged session

    T1078.004

  2. 2

    Create or select a snapshot

    T1578

  3. 3

    Share to an external account

    T1537

For leadership

Executive summary

Data theft in AWS does not always look like a large download. An adversary with the right permissions can share a database snapshot or disk snapshot with their own AWS account, or replicate a bucket, moving terabytes without the data ever crossing your network perimeter. Network-based data-loss tools will not see it. Preventing this relies on organization-level guardrails that restrict sharing to known accounts, and on alerting when sharing settings change. Because one policy can apply to every account at once, this is among the most cost-effective data-protection controls available, and it continues to work even when an individual account administrator has been compromised.

For engineers

Technical summary

ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute (createVolumePermission), rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute (restore), ec2:ModifyImageAttribute, and S3 replication or CopyObject to external buckets transfer data to other accounts using AWS-internal paths.

Environment and assumptions

Fictional company: a compromised administrator session in the production account. RDS snapshots of the customer database are taken daily and encrypted with the AWS managed key "aws/rds".

  • The adversary holds a session with snapshot and sharing permissions.
  • No SCP restricts sharing outside the organization.
  • Fictional and simplified for education.

Interactive

Attack sequence

Select a stage, or use the arrow keys, to see preconditions, evidence and controls.

Stage 1

Operate with a privileged session

The adversary uses a compromised administrator session.

Preconditions
  • Session with RDS/EC2 permissions
Required access
  • Privileged session.
Potential evidence
  • CloudTrail anomalies for the session
Defensive controls
  • Phishing-resistant MFA
  • Short sessions
Text version of the attack sequence
  1. Operate with a privileged session (T1078.004). The adversary uses a compromised administrator session. Preconditions: Session with RDS/EC2 permissions. Evidence: CloudTrail anomalies for the session. Controls: Phishing-resistant MFA; Short sessions.
  2. Create or select a snapshot (T1578). A recent snapshot is identified, or a new one created, possibly copied to re-encrypt with a shareable key. Preconditions: rds:CreateDBSnapshot / CopyDBSnapshot. Evidence: CloudTrail: CreateDBSnapshot, CopyDBSnapshot outside backup schedules. Controls: Restrict snapshot actions to backup roles.
  3. Share to an external account (T1537). The snapshot is shared with the adversary’s account, which restores it. Preconditions: rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute; Snapshot key usable by the external account (AWS managed keys cannot be shared, so the adversary re-encrypts with a customer managed key they can grant). Evidence: CloudTrail: ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute with an external account ID; KMS CreateGrant / PutKeyPolicy changes. Controls: SCP / RCP denying sharing outside the organization; Alert on sharing-attribute changes.

Technique mapping

MITRE ATT&CK and ATLAS techniques referenced in this scenario
IDTechniqueTactics (official)Stages
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud AccountsInitial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Stealth1
T1578Modify Cloud Compute InfrastructureDefense Impairment2
T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountExfiltration3

Technique names and tactic assignments come from the imported MITRE data. Mapping a stage to a technique is Securitain’s analysis.

Why the attack can succeed

  • Sharing APIs are designed to make cross-account transfer easy.
  • Network monitoring does not observe AWS-internal snapshot sharing.
  • Administrators commonly have both snapshot and KMS key administration rights.

What prevents or limits the attack

What may detect the attack

Detection signals and telemetry sources
SignalTelemetry sourceNotes
Snapshot / AMI sharing attribute changes naming external accountsCloudTrail management events—
Key policy or grant changes on data keysCloudTrail (KMS)—

Telemetry only helps if it is enabled before the incident and someone acts on it. Listing a signal here does not mean it is collected or monitored in your environment.

What Securitain may assess

  • Securitain can assess todayPublic and cross-account exposure checks on S3, KMS, SQS, SNS and Secrets Manager resource policies. Learn more
  • Securitain can assess todayDetection of identities with sensitive permissions such as broad S3 access, KMS decrypt or Secrets Manager reads. Learn more
  • Securitain can assess todayEffective-permission view that considers managed, inline, group, boundary and SCP policies together. Learn more

For leadership

Executive implications

confidentiality
Entire databases can be copied in one step.
compliance
Data residency and contractual data-handling commitments may be breached.

No financial loss estimates are given; impact depends on the data, contracts and regulation involved.

Next steps

  1. Deploy SCPs denying sharing outside the organization.
  2. Alert on sharing attribute changes.
  3. Separate KMS key administration from data administration.

References

MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK data © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (ATT&CK v20.1). Securitain is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE. Explanations, scenarios and control mappings on this page are Securitain’s own analysis. Sources and licensing

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