MITRE ATT&CK technique · T1537
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
How can data be transferred to another AWS account? Adversaries move data by sharing or copying it into a cloud account they control, using the provider’s own sharing features. The data never crosses your network edge.
For leadership
Executive takeaway
How it works in AWS
- Share an EBS, RDS or AMI snapshot with an external account ID.
- Replicate or copy S3 objects to an external bucket.
- Re-encrypt with a key the external account can use where needed.
What the attacker needs
- Sharing permissions (Modify*Attribute, PutBucketReplication)
- Usable encryption keys
Relevant AWS API calls
| API / event | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| ec2:ModifySnapshotAttribute | Grant createVolumePermission to another account. |
| rds:ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute | Grant restore to another account. |
| s3:PutBucketReplication | Replicate to another account’s bucket. |
A risky permission is not an observed attack
No SCP/RCP restricting sharing; admins combine snapshot and key-policy rights.
Sharing attribute changes naming accounts outside the organization.
Preventive and limiting controls
- SCPs denying sharing outside the organization
- Resource control policies / data perimeter
- Separate key administration
Mapped cloud controls
- preventiveResource control policies and data perimeter
Data-perimeter policies work in two directions: RCPs (aws:PrincipalOrgID) stop principals outside your organization from reading your resources, and SCPs (aws:ResourceOrgID) stop your identities from writing data to resources outside it, such as an attacker-owned bucket.
- restrictiveService control policy guardrails
SCPs can deny making snapshots or AMIs public or sharing them with accounts outside an approved list.
- detectiveAlerting on identity and logging changes
Sharing changes (snapshot / AMI attribute changes, bucket replication to unknown accounts) are management events that can be alerted on.
See assumptions and validation evidence in the Cloud Control Explorer →
Detection signals and telemetry
- Sharing API calls with external account IDs — CloudTrail management events
MITRE detection strategies (official, cloud-relevant analytics)
- DET0573 Cross-Platform Detection of Data Transfer to Cloud Account
- AN1580 (IaaS): Detects snapshot sharing, backup exports, or data object transfers from victim-owned cloud accounts to other cloud identities within the same provider (e.g., AWS, Azure) using snapshot sharing, S3 bucket policy updates, or SAS URI generation.Log sources: AWS:CloudTrail — ModifySnapshotAttribute; AWS:CloudTrail — PutBucketPolicy; AWS:CloudTrail — CreateSnapshot; AWS:CloudTrail — CopySnapshot; AWS:VPCFlowLogs — High volume internal-to-internal IP transfer or cross-account cloud transfer
- AN1581 (Office Suite): Detects user activity that shares or syncs files with external domains via link generation, OneDrive external sharing, or file transfer actions involving non-whitelisted partner tenants.Log sources: m365:unified — SharingSet; m365:unified — AnonymousLinkCreated; m365:unified — FileAccessed
- AN1582 (SaaS): Detects use of built-in SaaS sharing mechanisms to transfer ownership or share access of critical data to external tenants or untrusted users through API calls or link generation features.Log sources: saas:googledrive — drive.permission.add; saas:box — collaboration.invite
MITRE mitigations
Official MITRE description (excerpt)
Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.
A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.
Common misconceptions
- “Encrypted snapshots cannot be shared.”
- Snapshots encrypted with customer managed keys can be shared if the key policy allows; adversaries may re-encrypt to make sharing possible.
Attack scenarios using this technique
References
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