MITRE ATT&CK technique · T1555.006
Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores
How do attackers steal secrets from AWS Secrets Manager? Adversaries with read access to secrets services retrieve credentials for databases, third-party APIs and other systems, extending the intrusion beyond AWS.
For leadership
Executive takeaway
How it works in AWS
- List secrets to find names of interest.
- Call GetSecretValue on each accessible secret.
- Use the credentials against other systems.
Sub-technique of T1555 Credentials from Password Stores.
What the attacker needs
- secretsmanager:GetSecretValue (and kms:Decrypt) on the secrets
Relevant AWS API calls
| API / event | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| secretsmanager:ListSecrets | Enumerate secret names. |
| secretsmanager:GetSecretValue | Read secret values. |
| ssm:GetParameters (WithDecryption) | Parameter Store equivalents. |
A risky permission is not an observed attack
Roles with GetSecretValue on "*".
GetSecretValue by new principals or for many secrets in a short time.
Preventive and limiting controls
- Scope GetSecretValue per secret
- Customer managed keys with restricted decrypt
- Secret resource policies
Mapped cloud controls
- restrictiveManaged secrets with scoped access and rotation
Scoping secretsmanager:GetSecretValue to named secrets limits what a compromised identity can read.
- restrictiveCustomer managed keys with separated key policies
Secrets encrypted with a customer managed key also require kms:Decrypt on that key.
- detectiveAlerting on identity and logging changes
GetSecretValue calls are recorded by CloudTrail; reads by unusual principals or in bulk are suspicious.
See assumptions and validation evidence in the Cloud Control Explorer →
Detection signals and telemetry
- Unusual GetSecretValue patterns — CloudTrail
MITRE detection strategies (official, cloud-relevant analytics)
- DET0130 Detect Unauthorized Access to Cloud Secrets Management Stores
- AN0366 (IaaS): Detection of suspicious access to cloud-native secret management systems (AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, HashiCorp Vault). Focuses on abnormal secret retrieval activity, such as secrets being accessed by unusual identities, from unexpected regions, outside business hours, or at high volume.Log sources: AWS:CloudTrail — GetSecretValue
MITRE mitigations
Official MITRE description (excerpt)
Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.
Secrets managers support the secure centralized management of passwords, API keys, and other credential material. Where secrets managers are in use, cloud services can dynamically acquire credentials via API requests rather than accessing secrets insecurely stored in plain text files or environment variables.
Common misconceptions
- “Secrets Manager makes secrets safe.”
- It centralizes them; permissions decide who can read them.
AI security
Related MITRE ATLAS techniques
ATLAS and ATT&CK are separate frameworks. These relationships are listed explicitly, with their basis.
Attack scenarios using this technique
References
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