MITRE ATT&CK technique · T1700

AI-Enabled Exfiltration

What is AI-enabled exfiltration? AI-enabled exfiltration uses AI systems’ capabilities — tool calls, connectors, generated links or images — to move data to an adversary, often triggered by prompt injection.

ExfiltrationPlatforms: SaaS, WindowsATT&CK v20.1 · source modified · View on MITRE ATT&CK

For leadership

Executive takeaway

Every channel an agent can send data through is an exfiltration path. Constrain destinations and require approval for external sends.

How it works in AWS

  1. The adversary influences the agent (often via indirect injection).
  2. The agent gathers data it can access.
  3. Data leaves through a tool (email, HTTP), a connector, or rendered output such as an image URL.

What the attacker needs

  • Agent access to sensitive data
  • An outbound channel

Relevant AWS API calls

AWS API calls relevant to T1700
API / eventWhy it matters
lambda:InvokeFunctionAction-group tools that may send data externally.

A risky permission is not an observed attack

Potential exposure

Agents with broad data access plus unrestricted outbound tools or markdown rendering.

Observed behavior

Outbound tool calls to new destinations; responses with encoded data in URLs.

Preventive and limiting controls

  • Egress allow-lists
  • Human approval for external sends
  • Least-privilege agent roles
  • Disable automatic external image rendering

Mapped cloud controls

  • restrictiveRestricted agent egress and connectors

    Restricting where an agent can send data (tools, URLs, rendered links) narrows exfiltration channels.

  • detectiveAuditable agent and model activity

    Tool-call and model-invocation logs make it possible to reconstruct what data an agent sent where.

  • restrictiveDedicated least-privilege identity per agent and tool

    An agent can only exfiltrate data its identity can read; narrow roles limit what is at stake.

See assumptions and validation evidence in the Cloud Control Explorer →

Detection signals and telemetry

  • Agent sends to new destinations — Tool audit logs; proxy logs

MITRE detection strategies (official, cloud-relevant analytics)

  • DET0927 Detect AI-Enabled Exfiltration
    • AN2078 (SaaS): An analyst observes an AI agent access $ProtectedDataScope$, invoke a tool/API using that information or a derived payload, and the destination service record a successful transfer to a recipient, repository, tenant, domain, or service outside $AuthorizedAIDataFlows$.Log sources: saas:audit — Actual send/share/upload/write operation; AWS:bedrock — AgentTrace.actionGroupInvocationInput; AWS:bedrock — AgentTrace.knowledgeBaseLookupInput

MITRE mitigations

Official MITRE description (excerpt)

Adversaries may utilize Direct Prompt Injection, Indirect Prompt Injection or other methods to instruct enterprise AI agents to exfiltrate data. When enterprise systems incorporate the use of AI assistants or other AI agents, adversaries may abuse these systems to weaponize sanctioned tools available to the agent.

As an AI agent processes queries or ingests data, an injected prompt can cause the agent to use its tool connections in unauthorized or unintended ways. When AI agents are induced to exfiltrate data, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration to Code Repository or Exfiltration Over Web Service.

Common misconceptions

“If the model never sees secrets, nothing can leak.”
Agents with tools can fetch data themselves when instructed.

AI security

Related MITRE ATLAS techniques

ATLAS and ATT&CK are separate frameworks. These relationships are listed explicitly, with their basis.

Sensitive information disclosure and AI-enabled exfiltration →

Attack scenarios using this technique

References

MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK data © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (ATT&CK v20.1). MITRE ATLAS™ data (v2026.10) © MITRE, used under the Apache License 2.0. Securitain is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE. Explanations, scenarios and control mappings on this page are Securitain’s own analysis. Sources and licensing

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