AI security guide · MITRE ATLAS

Sensitive information disclosure and AI-enabled exfiltration

Can an AI agent expose sensitive data? AI systems can disclose data to users who should not see it (broken authorization at retrieval) or send it to outsiders (exfiltration through tools, connectors or rendered output).

ATLAS v2026.10Last updated
1. Reconnaissance12. Resource Development23. AI Attack Adaptation34. Initial Access45. AI Model Access56. Execution67. Persistence78. Privilege Escalation89. Defense Evasion910. Credential Access1011. Discovery1112. Lateral Movement1213. Collection (this technique)1314. Command and Control1415. Exfiltration (this technique)1516. Impact16ATLAS2 OF 16 TACTICS
13. Collection15. Exfiltration

Why it matters

AI assistants aggregate access. A single assistant connected to many repositories effectively grants every user the union of that access unless authorization is enforced per user.

How it works

  • Retrieval runs with a service identity and returns restricted content.
  • Injected instructions direct the agent to send data via tools.
  • Markdown images or links encode data in URLs fetched by the client.

Curated agent example

Fictional example: a company-wide assistant

  1. The assistant indexes all shared drives with one service account.
  2. An employee asks about "executive compensation changes".
  3. Restricted board material is summarized.
  4. Mitigation: filter retrieval by the user’s entitlements; exclude restricted repositories.

Fictional and simplified for education.

On AWS: architecture notes

  • Use metadata filtering in knowledge-base retrieval keyed to the user’s groups.
  • Scope the knowledge-base role to approved S3 prefixes.
  • Disable external image rendering in chat clients.
AWS IAM review bounds what a manipulated agent can do. It does not prove that the agent resists prompt injection.

MITRE ATLAS techniques

  • AML.T0085 Data from AI Services

    Collection · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may use their access to victim AI-enabled services to collect proprietary or otherwise sensitive information available to the system. As organizations adopt generative and agentic AI in centralized services for accessing an organization's data they become increasingly valuable targets for adversaries.

  • AML.T0086 Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation

    Exfiltration · Maturity: Realized

    AI agent tools capable of performing write operations may be invoked to exfiltrate data to an adversary. Sensitive information can be encoded into the tool's input parameters and transmitted to an adversary-controlled location (such as an inbox, document, or server) as part of a seemingly legitimate action. Variants include sending emails, creating or modifying documents, updating CRM records, or even generating media such as images or videos. The invoked tool itself may be legitimate but invoked by an adversary via LLM Prompt Injection, or the tool may be malicious (See AI Agent Tool Poisoning).

  • AML.T0024 Exfiltration via AI Inference API

    Exfiltration · Maturity: Realized

    Adversaries may exfiltrate information from a victim-controlled AI model or service through responses returned by its inference API. Transferred information may include predictions, scores, embeddings, generated content (e.g. text or images), or other sensitive information disclosed in model responses. Responses may be received directly or relayed through an intermediary.

  • AML.T0077 LLM Response Rendering

    Exfiltration · Maturity: Demonstrated

    Adversaries may induce a large language model (LLM) to respond with private information structured in a reference to external content that, when rendered by the user's client, makes a request to an adversary-controlled server, exfiltrating the data. The private information can be hidden from the user and the external content can still render properly in the user's client, thus not raising the suspicion of the user.

ATLAS mitigations

  • AML.M0019 Control Access to AI Models and Data in Production

    Require users to verify their identities before accessing a production model. Require authentication for API endpoints and monitor production model queries to ensure compliance with usage policies and to prevent model misuse.

  • AML.M0026 Manage AI Agent Service Access

    Limit service AI agents--agents using independently assigned service or workload permissions--to explicitly authorized workflows. Agents may serve multiple users or act on requests, events, or schedules. Examples include service desk agents fulfilling support requests, operations agents restarting services after monitoring alerts, and reporting agents reading organizational data and publishing scheduled summaries.

  • AML.M0032 Segmentation of AI Agent Components

    Define enforceable security boundaries around AI agent tools, data sources, identities, and execution environments. Mediate access through authenticated APIs, isolate code execution via containers or virtual machines, restrict filesystem and network access, and limit tool invocation rates. Build execution environments from clean base images for each run, and do not carry forward any operational state.

  • AML.M0024 AI Telemetry Logging and Monitoring

    Implement logging and monitoring across the AI lifecycle to detect suspicious activity and support investigation. Capture security-relevant access, changes, and operations across data pipelines, model development, deployment, and connected systems. Preserve sufficient context to trace activity across components and identify coordinated behavior across accounts and access pathways.

Related Enterprise ATT&CK techniques

Controls to prioritize

  • Authorization enforced by tools, not the model

    Tools must check the end user’s own permissions (and tenant) on every call. A model’s decision to call a tool is never an authorization decision.

    OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications
  • Restricted agent egress and connectors

    Limit the domains and services an agent runtime can reach, avoid generic "fetch any URL" tools, and approve third-party connectors before use.

    MITRE ATLAS mitigation: Segmentation of AI Agent Components
  • Dedicated least-privilege identity per agent and tool

    Give each agent tool its own narrowly scoped role (or a session policy) instead of a shared broad role, so a manipulated agent can only do what that tool legitimately needs.

    Security best practices in IAM
  • Input and output guardrails (defense in depth)

    Filters for prompt attacks, sensitive data and unsafe output reduce risk but are probabilistic. Use them alongside — never instead of — authorization and least privilege.

    Detect and filter harmful content by using Amazon Bedrock Guardrails

Cloud Control Explorer →

Common misconceptions

“If the user can access the assistant, they can see its answers.”
Answers must respect the user’s rights to the underlying data.

Checklist

  • Per-user authorization at retrieval
  • Egress allow-lists for agents
  • Disable external image rendering
  • Log sources and destinations

Run the AI Agent Security Self-Assessment

Related attack scenarios

More AI security guides

References

MITRE ATT&CK® and ATT&CK® are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. ATT&CK data © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation (ATT&CK v20.1). MITRE ATLAS™ data (v2026.10) © MITRE, used under the Apache License 2.0. Securitain is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE. Explanations, scenarios and control mappings on this page are Securitain’s own analysis. Sources and licensing

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